Abstract. Differential privacy is a notion of privacy that has become very popular in the database community. Roughly, the idea is that a randomized query mechanism provides sufficient privacy protection if the ratio between the probabilities that two adjacent datasets give the same answer is bound by e ǫ . In the field of information flow there is a similar concern for controlling information leakage, i.e. limiting the possibility of inferring the secret information from the observables. In recent years, researchers have proposed to quantify the leakage in terms of min-entropy leakage, a concept strictly related to the Bayes risk. In this paper, we show how to model the query system in terms of an informationtheoretic channel, and we compare the notion of differential privacy with that of min-entropy leakage. We show that differential privacy implies a bound on the min-entropy leakage, but not vice-versa. Furthermore, we show that our bound is tight. Then, we consider the utility of the randomization mechanism, which represents how close the randomized answers are to the real ones, in average. We show that the notion of differential privacy implies a bound on utility, also tight, and we propose a method that under certain conditions builds an optimal randomization mechanism, i.e. a mechanism which provides the best utility while guaranteeing ǫ-differential privacy.
Introduction
The area of statistical databases has been one of the first communities to consider the issues related to the protection of information. Already some decades ago, Dalenius [1] proposed a famous "ad omnia" privacy desideratum: nothing about an individual should be learnable from the database that could not be learned without access to the database.
Note that one of the important characteristics of differential privacy is that it abstracts away from the attacker's auxiliary information. The attacker might possess information about the database from external means, which could allow him to infer an individual's secret. Differential privacy ensures that no extra information can be obtained because of the individual's presence (or its particular value) in the database.
Dwork has also studied a technique to create an ǫ-differential private mechanism from an arbitrary numerical query. This is achieved by adding random noise to the result of the query, drawn from a Laplacian distribution with variance depending on ǫ and the query's sensitivity, i.e. the maximal difference of the query between any neighbour databases [4] .
Quantitative information flow. The problem of preventing the leakage of secret information has been a pressing concern also in the area of software systems, and has motivated a very active line of research called secure information flow. In this field, similarly to the case of privacy, the goal at the beginning was ambitious: to ensure non-interference, which means complete lack of leakage. But, as for Dalenius' notion of privacy, non-interference is too strong for being obtained in practice, and the community has started exploring weaker notions. Some of the most popular approaches are quantitative; they do not provide a yes-or-no answer but instead try to quantify the amount of leakage using techniques from information theory. See for instance [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
The various approaches in the literature mainly differ on the underlying notion of entropy. Each entropy is related to the type of attacker we want to model, and to the way we measure its success (see [9] for an illuminating discussion of this relation). The most widely used is Shannon entropy [13] , which models an adversary trying to find out the secret x by asking questions of the form "does x belong to a set S?". Shannon entropy is precisely the average number of questions necessary to find out the exact value of x with an optimal strategy (i.e. an optimal choice of the S's). The other most popular notion of entropy in this area is the min-entropy, proposed by Rényi [14] . The corresponding notion of attack is a single try of the form "is x equal to value v?". Min-entropy is precisely the logarithm of the probability of guessing the true value with the optimal strategy, which consists, of course, in selecting the v with the highest probability. It is worth noting that the conditional min-entropy, representing the a posteriori probability of success, is the converse of the Bayes risk [15] . Approaches based on min-entropy include [12, 16] while the Bayes risk has been used as a measure of information leakage in [17, 18] .
In this paper, we focus on the approach based on min-entropy. As it is typical in the areas of both quantitative information flow and differential privacy [19, 20] , we model the attacker's side information as a prior distribution on the set of all databases. In our results we abstract from the side information in the sense that we prove them for all prior distributions. Note that an interesting property of min-entropy leakage is that it is maximized in the case of a uniform prior [12, 16] . The intuition behind this is that the leakage is maximized when the attacker's initial uncertainty is high, so there is a lot to be learned. The more information the attacker has to begin with, the less it remains to be leaked.
Goal of the paper
The first goal of this paper is to explore the relation between differential privacy and quantitative information flow. First, we address the problem of characterizing the protection that differential privacy provides with respect to information leakage. Then, we consider the problem of the utility, that is the relation between the reported answer and the true answer. Clearly, a purely random result is useless, the reported answer is useful only if it provides information about the real one. It is therefore interesting to quantify the utility of the system and explore ways to improve it while preserving privacy. We attack this problem by considering the possible structure that the query induces on the true answers.
Contribution. The main contributions of this paper are the following:
-We propose an information-theoretic framework to reason about both information leakage and utility. -We prove that ǫ-differential privacy implies a bound on the information leakage.
The bound is tight and holds for all prior distributions. -We prove that ǫ-differential privacy implies a bound on the utility. We prove that, under certain conditions, the bound is tight and holds for all prior distributions. -We identify a method that, under certain conditions, constructs the randomization mechanisms which maximizes utility while providing ǫ-differential privacy.
Plan of the paper. The next section introduces some necessary background notions. Section 3 proposes an information-theoretic view of the database query systems, and of its decomposition in terms of the query and of the randomization mechanisms. Section 4 shows that differential privacy implies a bound on the min-entropy leakage, and that the bound is tight. Section 5 shows that differential privacy implies a bound on the utility, and that under certain conditions the bound is tight. Furthermore it shows how to construct an optimal randomization mechanism. Section 6 discusses related work, and Section 7 concludes. The proofs of the results are in the appendix.
Background
This section recalls some basic notions on differential privacy and information theory.
Differential privacy
The idea of differential privacy is that a randomized query provides sufficient privacy protection if two databases differing on a single row produce an answer with similar probabilities, i.e. probabilities whose ratio is bounded by e ǫ for a given ǫ ≥ 0. More precisely:
Definition 1 ([4]).
A randomized function K satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if for all of data sets D ′ and D ′′ differing on at most one row, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Information theory and interpretation in terms of attacks
In the following, X, Y denote two discrete random variables with carriers X = {x 0 , . . . , x n−1 }, Y = {y 0 , . . . , y m−1 }, and probability distributions p X (·), p Y (·), respectively. An information-theoretic channel is constituted of an input X, an output Y , and the matrix of conditional probabilities p Y |X (· | ·), where p Y |X (y | x) represent the probability that Y is y given that X is x. We shall omit the subscripts on the probabilities when they are clear from the context.
Min-entropy.
In [14] , Rényi introduced a one-parameter family of entropy measures, intended as a generalization of Shannon entropy. The Rényi entropy of order α (α > 0, α = 1) of a random variable X is defined as H α (X) = 1 1−α log 2 x ∈ X p(x) α . We are particularly interested in the limit of H α as α approaches ∞. This is called minentropy. It can be proven that
Rényi also defined the α-generalization of other information-theoretic notions, like the Kullback-Leibler divergence. However, he did not define the α-generalization of the conditional entropy, and there is no agreement on what it should be. For the case α = ∞, we adopt here the definition proposed in [21] :
We can now define the min-entropy leakage as
The worst-case leakage is taken by maximising over all input distributions (recall that the input distribution models the attacker's side information):
It has been proven in [16] that C ∞ is obtained at the uniform distribution, and that it is equal to the sum of the maxima of each column in the channel matrix, i.e.,
Interpretation in terms of attacks. Min-entropy can be related to a model of adversary who is allowed to ask exactly one question of the form "is X = x?" (one-try attack). More precisely, H ∞ (X) represents the (logarithm of the inverse of the) probability of success for this kind of attacks with the best strategy, which consists, of course, in choosing the x with the maximum probability. The conditional min-entropy H ∞ (X | Y ) represents (the logarithm of the inverse of) the probability that the same kind of adversary succeeds in guessing the value of X a posteriori, i.e. after observing the result of Y . The complement of this probability is also known as probability of error or Bayes risk. Since in general X and Y are correlated, observing Y increases the probability of success. Indeed we can prove formally that H ∞ (X | Y ) ≤ H ∞ (X), with equality if and only if X and Y are independent. The min-entropy leakage I ∞ (X; Y ) = H ∞ (X) − H ∞ (X|Y ) corresponds to the ratio between the probabilities of success a priori and a posteriori, which is a natural notion of leakage. Note that it is always the case that I ∞ (X; Y ) ≥ 0, which seems desirable for a good notion of leakage.
A model of utility and privacy for statistical databases
In this section we present a model of statistical queries on databases, where noise is carefully added to protect privacy and, in general, the reported answer to a query does not need to correspond to the real one. In this model, the notion of information leakage can be used to measure the amount of information that an attacker can learn about the database by posting queries and analysing their (reported) answers. Moreover, the model allows us to quantify the utility of the query, that is, how much information about the real answer can be obtained from the reported one. This model will serve as the basis for exploring the relation between differential privacy and information flow.
We fix a finite set Ind = {1, 2, . . . , u} of u individuals participating in the database. In addition, we fix a finite set V al = {v 1 ,v 2 , . . . ,v v }, representing the set of (v different) possible values for the sensitive attribute of each individual (e.g. disease-name in a medical database) 1 . Note that the absence of an individual from the database, if allowed, can be modeled with a special value in V al. As usual in the area of differential privacy Let K be a randomized function from X to Z, where Z = Range(K) (see Figure 1 ). This function can be modeled by a channel with input and output alphabets X , Z respectively. This channel can be specified as usual by a matrix of conditional probabilities p Z|X (·|·). We also denote by X, Z the random variables modeling the input and output of the channel. The definition of differential privacy can be directly expressed as a property of the channel: it satisfies ǫ-differential privacy iff
Intuitively, the correlation between X and Z measures how much information about the complete database the attacker can obtain by observing the reported answer. We will refer to this correlation as the leakage of the channel, denoted by L(X, Z). In Section 4 we discuss how this leakage can be quantified, using notions from information theory, and we study the behavior of the leakage for differentially private queries.
We then introduce a random variable Y modeling the true answer to the query f , ranging over Y = Range(f ). The correlation between Y and Z measures how much we can learn about the real answer from the reported one. We will refer to this correlation as the utility of the channel, denoted by U(Y, Z). In Section 5 we discuss in detail how utility can be quantified, and we investigate how to construct a randomization mechanism, i.e. a way of adding noise to the query outputs, so that utility is maximized while preserving differential privacy.
In practice, the randomization mechanism is often oblivious, meaning that the reported answer Z only depends on the real answer Y and not on the database X. In this case, the randomized function K, seen as a channel, can be decomposed into two parts: a channel modeling the query f , and a channel modeling the oblivious randomization Leakage about an individual. As already discussed, L(X, Z) can be used to quantify the amount of information about the whole database that is leaked to the attacker. However, protecting the database as a whole is not the main goal of differential privacy. Indeed, some information is allowed by design to be revealed, otherwise the query would not be useful. Instead, differential privacy aims at protecting the value of each individual. Although L(X, Z) is a good measure of the overall privacy of the system, we might be interested in measuring how much information about a single individual is leaked.
To quantify this leakage, we assume that the values of all other individuals are already known, thus the only remaining information concerns the individual of interest. 
Leakage
As discussed in the previous section, the correlation L(X, Z) between X and Z measures the information that the attacker can learn about the database by observing the reported answers. In this section, we consider min-entropy leakage as a measure of this information, that is L(X, Z) = I ∞ (X; Z). We then investigate bounds on information leakage imposed by differential privacy. These bounds hold for any side information of the attacker, modelled as a prior distribution on the inputs of the channel.
Our first result shows that the min-entropy leakage of a randomized function K is bounded by a quantity depending on ǫ, the numbers u, v of individuals and values respectively. We assume that v ≥ 2.
Theorem 1.
If K provides ǫ-differential privacy then for all input distributions, the min-entropy leakage associated to K is bounded from above as follows: Fig 4(a) represents the set X of all possible datasets and its adjacency relation. We now construct the matrix with input X which provides ǫ-differential privacy and has the highest min-entropy leakage. From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that each element of the matrix is of the form Fig 4(a) ) between (the dataset of) the row which contains such element and (the dataset of) the row with the highest value in the same column. Fig 4(b) illustrates this matrix, where, for the sake of readability, each value a e ǫ d is represented simply by d. Note that the bound B(u, v, ǫ) is guaranteed to be reached with the uniform input distribution. We know from the literature [16, 12] that the I ∞ of a given matrix has its maximum in correspondence of the uniform input distribution, although it may not be the only case.
The construction of the matrix for Proposition 1 gives a square matrix of dimension v u × v u . Often, however, the range of K is fixed, as it is usually related to the possible answers to the query f . Hence it is natural to consider the scenario in which we are given a number r < v u , and want to consider only those K's whose range has cardinality at most r. In this restricted setting, we could find a better bound than the one given by Theorem 1, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 2. Let K be a randomized function and let r = |Range(K)|. If K provides ǫ-differential privacy then for all input distributions, the min-entropy leakage associated to K is bounded from above as follows:
where ℓ = ⌊log v r⌋.
Note that this bound can be much smaller than the one provided by Theorem 1. For instance, if r = v this bound becomes:
which for large values of u is much smaller than B(u, v, ǫ). In particular, for v = 2 and u approaching infinity, this bound approaches 1, while B(u, v, ǫ) approaches infinity. Let us clarify that there is no contradiction with the fact that the bound B(u, v, ǫ) is strict: indeed it is strict when we are free to choose the range, but here we fix the dimension of the range.
Finally, note that the above bounds do not hold in the opposite direction. Since min-entropy averages over all observations, low probability observations affect it only slightly. Thus, by introducing an observation with a negligible probability for one user, and zero probability for some other user, we could have a channel with arbitrarily low min-entropy leakage but which does not satisfy differential privacy for any ǫ.
Measuring the leakage about an individual
As discussed in Section 3, the main goal of differential privacy is not to protect information about the complete database, but about each individual. To capture the leakage about a certain individual, we start from a tuple D 
Note that this bound is stronger than the one of Theorem 1. In particular, it depends only on ǫ and not on u, v.
Utility
As discussed in Section 3, the utility of a randomized function K is the correlation between the real answers Y for a query and the reported answers Z. In this section we analyze the utility U(Y, Z) using the classic notion of utility functions (see for instance [23] ).
For our analysis we assume an oblivious randomization mechanism. As discussed in Section 3, in this case the system can be decomposed into two channels, and the utility becomes a property of the channel associated to the randomization mechanism H which maps the real answer y ∈ Y into a reported answer z ∈ Z according to given probability distributions p Z|Y (·|·). However, the user does not necessarily take z as her guess for the real answer, since she can use some Bayesian post-processing to maximize the probability of success, i.e. a right guess. Thus for each reported answer z the user can remap her guess to a value y ′ ∈ Y according to a remapping function ρ(z) : Z → Y, that maximizes her expected gain. For each pair (y, y ′ ), with y ∈ Y, y ′ = ρ(y), there is an associated value given by a gain (or utility) function g(y, y ′ ) that represents a score of how useful it is for the user to guess the value y ′ as the answer when the real answer is y.
It is natural to define the global utility of the mechanism H as the expected gain:
where p(y) is the prior probability of real answer y, and p(y ′ |y) is the probability of user guessing y ′ when the real answer is y.
We can derive the following characterization of the utility. We use δ x to represent the probability distribution which has value 1 on x and 0 elsewhere.
A very common utility function is the binary gain function, which is defined as g bin (y, y ′ ) = 1 if y = y ′ and g bin (y, y ′ ) = 0 if y = y ′ . The rationale behind this function is that, when the answer domain does not have a notion of distance, then the wrong answers are all equally bad. Hence the gain is total when we guess the exact answer, and is 0 for all other guesses. Note that if the answer domain is equipped with a notion of distance, then the gain function could take into account the proximity of the reported answer to the real one, the idea being that a close answer, even if wrong, is better than a distant one.
In this paper we do not assume a notion of distance, and we will focus on the binary case. The use of binary utility functions in the context of differential privacy was also investigated in [20] 2 . By substituting g with g bin in the above formula we obtain:
which tells us that the expected utility is the greatest when ρ(z) = y is chosen to maximize p(y, z). Assuming that the user chooses such a maximizing remapping, we have:
This corresponds to the converse of the Bayes risk, and it is closely related to the conditional min-entropy and to the min-entropy leakage:
A bound on the utility
In this section we show that the fact that K provides ǫ-differential privacy induces a bound on the utility. We start by extending the adjacency relation ∼ from the datasets X to the answers Y. Intuitively, the function f associated to the query determines a partition on the set of all databases (X , i.e. Val u ), and we say that two classes are adjacent if they contain an adjacent pair. More formally:
Definition 2. Given y, y
′ ∈ Y, with y = y ′ , we say that y and y ′ are adjacent (notation
Since ∼ is symmetric on databases, it is also symmetric on Y, therefore also (Y, ∼) forms an undirected graph. 
We recall that a graph automorphism is a permutation of its vertices that preserves its edges. If σ is a permutation of S then an orbit of σ is a set of the form {σ i (s) | i ∈ N} where s ∈ S. A permutation has a single orbit iff {σ i (s)|i ∈ N} = S for all s ∈ S. The next theorem provides a bound on the utility in the case in which (Y, ∼) admits a graph automorphism with a single orbit. Note that this condition implies that the graph has a very regular structure; in particular, all nodes must have the same number of incident edges. Examples of such graphs are rings and cliques (but they are not the only cases). 
where n is the maximum distance from y in Y.
The bound provided by the above theorem is strict in the sense that for every ǫ and Y there exist an adjacency relation ∼ for which we can construct a randomization mechanism H that provides ǫ-differential privacy and whose utility achieves the bound of Theorem 3. This randomization mechanism is therefore optimal, in the sense that it provides the maximum possible utility for the given ǫ. Intuitively, the condition on ∼ is that |Border d (y)| must be exactly c or 0 for every d > 0. In the next section we will define formally such an optimal randomization mechanism, and give examples of queries that determine a relation ∼ satisfying the condition.
Constructing an optimal randomization mechanism
Assume f : X → Y, and consider the graph structure (Y, ∼) determined by f . Let n be the maximum distance between two nodes in the graph and let c be an integer. We construct the matrix M of conditional probabilities associated to H as follows. For every column z ∈ Z and every row y ∈ Y, define:
The following theorem guarantees that the randomization mechanism H defined above is well defined and optimal, under certain conditions. The conditions for the construction of the optimal matrix are strong, but there are some interesting cases in which they are satisfied. Depending on the degree of connectivity c, we can have several different cases whose extremes are:
-(Y, ∼) is a ring, i.e. every element has exactly two adjacent elements. This is similar to the case of the counting queries considered in [20] , with the difference that our "counting" is in arithmetic modulo |Y|. -(Y, ∼) is a clique, i.e. every element has exactly |Y| − 1 adjacent elements.
Remark 1.
Note that when we have a ring with an even number of nodes the conditions of Theorem 4 are almost met, except that |Border d (y)| = 2 for d < n, and |Border d (y)| = 1 for d = n, where n is the maximum distance between two nodes in Y. In this case, and if (e ǫ ) 2 ≥ 2, we can still construct a legal matrix by doubling the value of such elements. Namely, by defining
For all the other elements the definition remains as in (6).
Remark 2. Note that our method can be applied also when the conditions of Theorem 4 are not met: We can always add "artificial" adjacencies to the graph structure so to meet those conditions. Namely, for computing the distance in (6) we use, instead of (Y, ∼), a structure (Y, ∼ ′ ) which satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4, and such that ∼ ⊆ ∼ ′ . Naturally, the matrix constructed in this way provides ǫ-differential privacy, but in general is not optimal. Of course, the smaller ∼ ′ is, the higher is the utility. In/Out A B C D E F A 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 B 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 C 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 D 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 E 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7 F 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 The matrices generated by our algorithm above can be very different, depending on the value of c. The next two examples illustrate queries that give rise to the clique and to the ring structures, and show the corresponding matrices.
Example 2. Consider a database with electoral information where rows corresponds to voters. Let us assume, for simplicity, that each row contains only three fields:
-ID: a unique (anonymized) identifier assigned to each voter; -CITY: the name of the city where the user voted; -CANDIDATE: the name of the candidate the user voted for.
Consider the query "What is the city with the greatest number of votes for a given candidate?". For this query the binary function is a natural choice for the gain function: only the right city gives some gain, and any wrong answer is just as bad as any other.
It is easy to see that every two answers are neighbors, i.e. the graph structure of the answers is a clique.
Consider the case where CITY={A,B,C,D,E,F} and assume for simplicity that there is a unique answer for the query, i.e., there are no two cities with exactly the same number of individuals voting for a given candidate. Table 1 shows two alternative mechanisms providing ǫ-differential privacy (with ǫ = log 2). The first one, M 1 , is based on the truncated geometric mechanism method used in [20] for counting queries (here extended to the case where every two answers are neighbors). The second mechanism, M 2 , is the one we propose in this paper.
Taking the input distribution, i.e. the distribution on Y , as the uniform distribution, it is easy to see that U(M 1 ) = 0.2243 < 0.2857 = U(M 2 ). Even for non-uniform distributions, our mechanism still provides better utility. For instance, for p(A) = p(F ) = 1/10 and p(B) = p(C) = p(D) = P (E) = 1/5, we have U(M 1 ) = 0.2412 < 0.2857 = U(M 2 ). This is not too surprising: the Laplacian method and the geometric mechanism work very well when the domain of answers is provided with a metric and the utility function takes into account the proximity of the reported answer to the real one. It also works well when (Y, ∼) has low connectivity, in particular in the cases of a ring and of a line. But in this example, we are not in these cases, because we are considering binary gain functions and high connectivity. Example 3. Consider the same database as the previous example, but now assume a counting query of the form "What is the number of votes for candidate cand ?". It is easy to see that each answer has at most two neighbors. More precisely, the graph structure on the answers is a line. For illustration purposes, let us assume that only 5 individuals have participated in the election. Table 2 shows two alternative mechanisms providing ǫ-differential privacy (ǫ = log 2): (a) the truncated geometric mechanism M 1 proposed in [20] and (b) the mechanism M 2 that we propose, where c = 2 and n = 3. Note that in order to apply our method we have first to apply Remark 2 to transform the line into a ring, and then Remark 1 to handle the case of the elements at maximal distance from the diagonal. Le us consider the uniform prior distribution. We see that the utility of M 1 is higher than the utility of M 2 , in fact the first is 4/9 and the second is 4/11. This does not contradict our theorem, because our matrix is guaranteed to be optimal only in the case of a ring structure, not a line as we have in this example. If the structure were a ring, i.e. if the last row were adjacent to the first one, then M 1 would not provide ǫ-differential privacy. In case of a line as in this example, the truncated geometric mechanism has been proved optimal [20] .
Related work
As far as we know, the first work to investigate the relation between differential privacy and information-theoretic leakage for an individual was [24] . In this work, a channel is relative to a given database x, and the channel inputs are all possible databases adjacent to x. Two bounds on leakage were presented, one for the Shannon entropy, and one for the min-entropy. The latter corresponds to Theorem 2 in this paper (note that [24] is an unpublished report).
Barthe and Köpf [25] were the first to investigates the (more challenging) connection between differential privacy and the min-entropy leakage for the entire universe of possible databases. They consider only the hiding of the participation of individuals in a database, which corresponds to the case of v = 2 in our setting. They consider the "end-to-end differentially private mechanisms", which correspond to what we call K in our paper, and propose, like we do, to interpret them as information-theoretic channels. They provide a bound for the leakage, but point out that it is not tight in general, and show that there cannot be a domain-independent bound, by proving that for any number of individual u the optimal bound must be at least a certain expression f (u, ǫ). Finally, they show that the question of providing optimal upper bounds for the leakage of K in terms of rational functions of ǫ is decidable, and leave the actual function as an open question. In our work we used rather different techniques and found (independently) the same function f (u, ǫ) (the bound B(u, v, ǫ) in Theorem 1 for v = 2), but we proved that f (u, ǫ) is a bound, and therefore the optimal bound 3 . Clarkson and Schneider also considered differential privacy as a case study of their proposal for quantification of integrity [26] . There, the authors analyzed database privacy conditions from the literature (such as differential privacy, k-anonymity, and ldiversity) using their framework for utility quantification. In particular, they studied the relationship between differential privacy and a notion of leakage (which is different from ours -in particular their definition is based on Shannon entropy) and they provided a tight bound on leakage.
Heusser and Malacaria [27] were among the first to explore the application of information-theoretic concepts to databases queries. They proposed to model database queries as programs, which allows for statical analysis of the information leaked by the query. However [27] did not attempt to relate information leakage to differential privacy.
In [20] the authors aimed at obtaining optimal-utility randomization mechanisms while preserving differential privacy. The authors proposed adding noise to the output of the query according to the geometric mechanism. Their framework is very interesting because it provides us with a general definition of utility for a randomization mechanism M that captures any possible side information and preference (defined as a loss function) the users of M may have. They proved that the geometric mechanism is optimal in the particular case of counting queries. Our results in Section 5 do not restrict to counting queries, however we only consider the case of binary loss function.
Conclusion and future work
An important question in statistical databases is how to deal with the trade-off between the privacy offered to the individuals participating in the database and the utility provided by the answers to the queries. In this work we proposed a model integrating the notions of privacy and utility in the scenario where differential-privacy is applied. We derived a strict bound on the information leakage of a randomized function satisfying ǫ-differential privacy and, in addition, we studied the utility of oblivious differential privacy mechanisms. We provided a way to optimize utility while guaranteeing differential privacy, in the case where a binary gain function is used to measure the utility of the answer to a query.
As future work, we plan to find bounds for more generic gain functions, possibly by using the Kantorovich metric to compare the a priori and a posteriori probability distributions on secrets. 
Proof. We first show that there exists an n × m matrix N and an injective total function ρ : A → B such that:
-N i,ρ(i) = max ρ(i) N for all i ∈ A, -N i,j = 0 for all j ∈ B\ρ(A) and all i ∈ A.
We iteratively construct ρ, N "column by column" via a sequence of approximating partial functions ρ s and matrices N s (0 ≤ s ≤ m).
-Initial step (s = 0).
Define ρ 0 (i) = ⊥ for all i ∈ A and N 0 = M .
-s th step (1 ≤ s ≤ m). Let j be the s-th column and let i ∈ A be one of the rows containing the maximum value of column j in M , i.e. M i,j = max j M . There are two cases:
Since the first step assigns j in ρ s and the second zeroes the column j in N s , all unassigned columns B \ ρ m (A) must be zero in N m . We finish the construction by taking ρ to be the same as ρ m after assigning to each unassigned row one of the columns in B \ ρ m (A) (there are enough such columns since n ≤ m). We also take N = N m . Note that by construction N is a channel matrix.
Thus we get a matrix N and a function ρ : A → B which, by construction, is injective and satisfies N i,ρ(i) = max ρ(i) N for all i ∈ A, and N i,j = 0 for all j ∈ B\ρ(A) and all i ∈ A. Furthermore, N provides ǫ-differential privacy because each column is a linear combination of columns of M . It is also easy to see that
Finally, we create our claimed matrix M ′ from N as follows: first, we eliminate all columns in B \ ρ(A). Note that all these columns are zero so the resulting matrix is a proper channel matrix, provides differential privacy and has the same conditional min-entropy. Finally, we rearrange the columns according to ρ. Note that the order of the columns is irrelevant, any permutation represents the same conditional probabilities thus the same channel. The resulting matrix M ′ is n × n and has all maxima in the diagonal. 
We now show that the elements of the diagonal have the intended properties. First, we show that the elements of the diagonal are all the same. We have that B i,d(h,h) = B i,0 = {i} for all h ∈ A, and therefore:
Then, we show that they are the maxima for each column. Note that
which is independent of i. We have:
(M has maxima in the diag.)
to the result of Lemma 1. The final matrix M has size n × n, with n = |X | = v u , provides ǫ-differential privacy, and for all rows i, h we have that M i,i = M h,h and M i,i = max i M . Furthermore, I
Therefore: 
Consider now the case in which r is not of the form v ℓ . Let ℓ be the maximum integer such that v ℓ < r, and let m = r − v ℓ . We transform the matrix M associated to K by collapsing the m columns with the smallest maxima into the m columns with highest maxima. Namely, let j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j m the indices of the columns which have the smallest maxima values, i.e. max jt M ≤ max j M for every column j = j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j m . Similarly, let k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k m be the indexes of the columns which have maxima values. Then, define
Finally, eliminate the m zero-ed columns to obtain a matrix with exactly v ℓ columns. It is easy to show that We now turn our attention to the min-entropy leakage associated to an individual.
Lemma 4. If a randomized function K :
A → B respects an ǫ-ratio in the sense that p K (b|a ′ ) ≤ e ǫ · p K (b|a ′′ ) for all a ′ , a ′′ ∈ A and b ∈ B, then the min-entropy leakage from A to B is bounded by:
Proof. For clarity reasons, in this proof we use the notation p(b|A = a) for the probability distributions p K (b|A = a) associated to K. (e ǫ ) t ≤ (e ǫ ) n ⇐⇒ (geometric progression sum)
α (e ǫ ) n + c α 1 − (e ǫ ) n 1 − e ǫ ≤ (e ǫ ) n ⇐⇒ α ≤ (e ǫ ) n (1 − e ǫ ) (e ǫ ) n (1 − e ǫ ) + c (1 − (e ǫ ) n )
Since U(Y, Z) = α, we conclude. Then, for such c, the definition in (6) determines a legal channel matrix for H, i.e., for each y ∈ Y, p Z|Y (·|y) is a probability distribution. Furthermore, the composition K of f and H provides ǫ-differential privacy. Finally, H is optimal in the sense that it maximizes utility when the distribution of Y is uniform.
Proof. We follow a reasoning analogous to the proof of Theorem 3, but using |Border (y, d)| = c, to prove that U(Y, Z) = (e ǫ ) n (1 − e ǫ ) (e ǫ ) n (1 − e ǫ ) + c (1 − (e ǫ ) n )
From the same theorem, we know that this is a maximum for the utility.
